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I.

Introduction

The 2008-2009 global financial crisis highlighted the interdependency of financial institutions
and markets worldwide. Globally, fiscal support packages totalling 3 trillion USD were
introduced, placing enormous strain on the public finances of a number of countries.
Estimates of global banking writedowns are currently more than 3 trillion USD. When the
commercial paper market collapsed, the US alone lost 95 billion USD in value overnight.2 In
the European Union (EU), in the absence of mechanisms to organize an orderly wind down,
Member States had no choice but to bail out their banking sector, and state aid to support
banks continues to mount.3 In the G-7 countries alone, there was 2 trillion USD in lost
GDP, higher fiscal deficits, millions of lost jobs, and tremendous financial hardship for
affected individuals.4 Even in jurisdictions such as Canada, with relatively well-managed
banking systems, a generalized loss of confidence led to a sharp rise in funding costs.5 The
largest negative effects of the financial crisis on the Canadian economy stemmed from crises
originating in other countries, with adverse contagion effects on the Canadian banking
system, making it very difficult for Canadian banks to fund themselves in foreign markets.6
Bank supervisory authorities and financial institutions now appreciate that financial systems
must be strengthened to enhance their capacity to withstand shocks.
There is considerable international initiative to devise mechanisms to prevent such failures in
the future and to create new insolvency resolution schemes to address financial firm failure.
Bank supervisors and other regulators are trying to discern the appropriate mix of prudential
oversight and private sector governance. This paper examines two discreet issues within this
much larger topic. Part II examines the need for regulatory oversight and coordination in
preventing liquidity and solvency issues related to banks and other financial institutions.
Reform is required to smooth out highs and lows within capital cycles and to address the
need for cross-border resolution mechanisms for bank insolvency. Part III then examines
the role of bank governance in preventing and addressing bank insolvency, suggesting that
governance needs to be prudential, pragmatic and prescient if we are to reduce the frequency
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and severity of future bank failures.
i.

Context

The underlying causes of failed financial institutions were complex, and continue to be the
subject of considerable study. They include the interplay of structured financial products and
real economic activity, regulatory gaps, inadequate liquidity and capital adequacy standards,
extreme leveraging that accounted for much of the increase in banks’ returns on equity, and
a failure to understand the complexity of systemic risk. In the banking sector, the shift to
self-governance under Basel II resulted in a reduction in overall capital requirements, with
commercial banks shifting assets from banking to trading books; and an asset-backed and
mortgage-backed commercial paper market premised on ongoing liquidity, with little
attention to systemic risk.7 The originate and distribute model of lending resulted in less
front end assessment of credit worthiness, as lenders were offloading their risk almost
immediately. Where credit was granted, it was “covenant light”, without the traditional terms
and conditions that ensured monitoring and early intervention. In the EU, many banks
operated throughout Europe on a “passport” system, but there was no mechanism to deal
with the cross-border implications of Europe-wide bank insolvency. There was also a
tension between short-term returns and long-term sustainability of financial systems,
compounded by bank compensation practices that rewarded high fees for short-term profit.
The situation was exacerbated by moral hazard issues. In the classic bank finance paradigm,
stakeholders with an economic interest in the bank have the greatest interest in monitoring;
yet the existence of credit derivatives complicated this premise by affecting the motivations
of various stakeholders, creating agency issues and negative externalities.8 Creditors with
material holdings of derivatives for speculative purposes may have economic interests that
7
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encourage them to cause a credit event such that they realize on their “bet”. Collateralized
debt obligations meant risk was shed immediately and the positive externalities associated
with debt governance were lost. The prudential nature of banks was disregarded in a number
of instances. In other cases, banks thought that they had insulated their core prudential
banking function by having spin-off entities work in the speculative financial products
market, but the contagion effect of liquidity crises and inadequate capital to meet calls on
collateral placed the related entities at risk.
Once the crisis was in full flight, the “lender of last resort” legislation that provided funds
when banks fail created further moral hazard in that the availability of bailout funds created
incentives for banks to undertake riskier activities, knowing that directors and shareholders
would benefit from any financial upside to riskier strategies and that taxpayers would bear
the consequences of any downside.
These factors, in very broad brush strokes, paint a picture of a financial system that failed to
appreciate its interdependency or its effect on real economic activity. The situation was
exacerbated because, notwithstanding that the financial system was globally interconnected,
the failure of a bank is treated domestically, not internationally. There was no framework for
the resolution of cross-border financial group or conglomerate insolvency. Even at the
national level, few jurisdictions had an effective framework for the resolution of domestic
financial groups. Cross-border resolution of bank failure was also complicated by the
potential effect of restructuring or liquidation on foreign operations and the lack of capacity,
or in some instances, willingness, to bear a share of the burden of bank insolvency.
II.

Regulatory Oversight in Preventing and Addressing Illiquidity and Insolvency

i.

Identifying the Structural Problems

Prior to the financial crisis, there was a failure to appreciate the contagion risk associated
with failure of a large bank. Banks are highly interconnected in interbank, OTC derivatives
and foreign exchange markets. The structure of the market makes banks simultaneously
competitors and co-operators, and that degree of interconnectedness undermines the ability
of an individual bank to control its liquidity and solvency, in turn increasing risk of systemic
failure.9
The Basel Committee has reported that the way in which risk was assessed by banks was
highly problematic, observing that in certain portfolios, market and credit risk are
inextricably linked, and that widely-used conventional approaches that estimate each risk
type separately and then aggregate them can lead to sizable bias in overall risk estimates.10
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In some instances, banks had left too much risk on their own books; in other cases, they had
shed that risk as the original lender, but had acquired considerable risk from the purchase of
commercial paper in the interbank market or participation in syndicated highly risky and
improperly priced debt. Once banks started to fail from the U.S. sub-prime mortgage
meltdown, there was serious contagion within the global financial system. While there had
been notable financial crises in recent years, the size, intensity and reach of this crisis was
unique.11 Illiquidity at one bank spread rapidly to other banks. This structural risk increased
the likelihood of runs on banks and losses by depositors. There was a lack of any effective
system-wide oversight, which allowed for the regulatory arbitrage that developed in the
shadow banking sector, further contributing to the crisis.12 Globally, deposit insurance
coverage was restricted to the smallest depositors and thus was not of assistance for many
stakeholders when banks began to fail.
Derivatives were a significant aspect of the financial landscape. Although not the subject of
this paper, it is important to note that the complex nature of the products, such as credit
default swaps (CDS), collateralized debt obligations (CDO), index trades and credit-linked
notes, shifted the market away from primarily a risk management strategy to a highly
speculative market.13 Risk became “commodified”. The rapid introduction of new complex
products created systemic risks to financial markets, in turn, to real economies, without the
monitoring and discipline that occurs for securities markets or traditional commercial
lending activity. The lack of transparency of products meant that counterparty risk was not
well-understood or appropriately priced.14 With a complex interlocking set of claims, the
financial system became increasingly interconnected, operating on a global scale and
concentrated in a few key financial hubs. The over the counter (OTC) CDS market was illequipped to deal with bank failures and “cascading swaps” as the market tried to settle
CDS.15
Securitization was also a problem that had not been appropriately identified as a downside
risk. Securitization was originally aimed at transforming credit risk into market risk by
pooling loans and issuing tradable claims against the pool; a risk management tool that relied

then only combines them at a higher level, often in a linear way. Since it therefore neglects a multitude of
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on the liquidity of primary markets for placing asset-backed securities.16 Securitization differs
from traditional bank lending because banks, after having originated the loans, hold them
only for a short time before the loans are sold or before the associated risks of the loans are
sliced into tranches and then sold. When structured appropriately, securitization allows a
bank to manage credit and other risks of its loan portfolio.17 However, a negative feature of
securitization by banks was that, in many instances, once fees on the original loan were
extracted by the bank, the financial risk was passed along to various tranches of debt. There
was a failure to understand the incentive effects of this originate and distribute model of
lending. The collateralized debt obligations resulted in less front end assessment of credit
worthiness, as lenders were offloading their risk almost immediately. The incentive effects
were that banks’ intermediation function, including screening and monitoring of borrowers,
was severely impaired and products were mispriced. Once securitization markets became
illiquid, banks were exposed to heightened risk from exposures to credit risk, such as loans
that could no longer be securitized, and to market risk, from changes in the mark-to-market
value of the securitized assets.18
Rating instruments were also outdated, and investors relied too much on credit ratings that
failed to take account of liquidity risk and the lack of transparency on investments. There
were conflicts of interest in the way in which credit rating agencies were compensated,
creating incentives to not be rigorous in assessing and pricing risk of particular financial
products. When the loan quality of US subprime mortgages worsened, the belated realization
by agencies resulted in ratings downgrades; investors began to shun the products as they
could not accurately price risk; there was a rapid spread to other financial products and
concern emerged regarding the financial health of bank counterparties.19
In identifying the structural problems, it is important to note that a bank’s core business is to
voluntarily accept a mismatch in the term structure of its assets and its liabilities; and bank
viability depends on continuous access to liquidity, be it deposits, short-term funding on the
interbank market, funding in secured financing markets or funding from a central bank as
the liquidity provider of last resort.20 Banks are compensated for accepting a maturity
mismatch by the premium charged to creditors.21 Yet too much leverage increases a bank’s
probability of default, and depositors and creditors will demand a higher risk premium for
the higher risk of insolvency.22 An important lesson of the crisis is the need to provide for
more rigorous prudential regulation pertaining to banks’ liquidity risk management.23
16
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Mülbert observes that because of the mismatch in the term structure of assets and liabilities,
banks are subject to creditor runs; and readily available liquidity reserves can be rapidly
exhausted as most bank assets cannot be quickly liquidated.24 Hence, there is a collective
action problem in that a race to the money will result in only the first creditors receiving a
timely and full payout.
An example is Northern Rock, which in 2008 was the fifth largest bank in the UK, and the
first to experience a crisis in that jurisdiction. The bank was solvent, its assets were sufficient
to cover its liabilities, but it faced a liquidity problem when institutional lenders stopped
lending during the sub-prime meltdown.25 Northern Rock sought a liquidity support facility
from the Bank of England, due to difficulty raising funds to replace maturing money market
borrowings. The Bank of England could not lend quietly as it would violate the EU Market
Abuse Directive, but before it announced the financial support, the media leaked the
information, creating a run on the bank.26 £1 billion, 5% of total deposits, was withdrawn by
customers the first day the news became public.27 The initial loan was not sufficient to stem
the exit of capital, and by early 2008, Northern Rock's loan from the Bank of England had
grown to £28bn.28 There was no market in private bids for the bank that offered sufficient
value to meet the massive debt and liquidity crisis; and the UK government moved in to
nationalize the bank for a temporary period, replacing the board of directors.29 The
government lacked legal powers to address the insolvency on a timely basis. Insolvency
administration was not viewed as a viable option as depositors’ claims would have been
subordinated under UK law and the UK’s deposit insurance scheme was not pre-funded. In
January 2010, HM Treasury legislation restructured Northern Rock, dividing it into a “good
bank” and a “toxic bank”; creating two separate entities, a savings and mortgage bank and
asset management, allowing the viable business to continue and retaining the toxic assets in
the other entity.30
The collapse of Northern Rock appears to have been primarily a governance failure. The
bank's senior management and directors failed to meet their primary responsibility of
ensuring financial soundness. However, it was also a regulatory failure. The UK Financial
Services Authority (FSA) found its supervision of the bank did not meet appropriate
standards due to high turnover of its senior supervisory staff, a lack of specialist regulators,
European Banking Supervisors, “Consultation Paper on Liquidity Buffers and Survival Periods,”
Consultation Paper July 28, 2009, www.c-ebs.org/Publications/Consultation-Papers/Allconsultations/CP21-CP30/CP28.aspx.
24
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27
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28
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29
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and a lack of continuity of oversight.31 Ironically, the UK Treasury and FSA had conducted
“war games” during training sessions in 2005, including a simulated failure of Northern
Rock, during which they discovered that they lacked effective authority to deal with a bank
collapse in an orderly manner; yet the government concluded at the time that the risk of
failure of major banks was remote and thus was not a priority in its legislative agenda.32
Also in the UK, Bradford & Bingley was nationalized by the UK government; about 60% of
its business had been funded through sub-prime lending.33 Like HBOS and Northern Rock,
it had relied heavily on the mortgage market while other banks had a more diversified and
broader base.34 Rapidly growing bank illiquidity and insolvency threatened the UK economy.
In April 2008, the Bank of England launched a scheme to allow banks to temporarily swap
their high quality illiquid mortgage-backed and other securities for UK Treasury Bills.35 The
UK Minister of Finance was given the ability to disburse funds in order to establish a new
financial undertaking or takeover a financial undertaking or its bankrupt estate, either wholly
or in part.36 Key points of the funding plan included that banks were to increase their capital
by at least £25bn and could borrow from the government to do so; an additional £25bn in
capital would be available in exchange for preference shares; £100bn would be available in
short-term loans from the Bank of England, on top of an existing loan facility worth
£100bn; and up to £250bn in loan guarantees would be available at commercial rates to
encourage banks to lend to each other.37
The UK bailout came with ties. It required a guarantee that there would be capital available
for day to day operations, signalling to creditors that they were protected from future losses.
There were limits on remuneration for bank executives and restrictions on giving on
dividends. For example, in return for providing fresh liquidity, the UK government secured a
promise from RBS and Lloyds not to pay a dividend that year and possibly in additional
years, and a promise to help people who were struggling to pay their mortgages.38 They were
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not to pay any cash bonuses, and agreed to let the government appoint several board
members.39
In the US, Lehman Brothers’ failure in 2008 was due to the interbank market, rather than a
classic run on the bank. Lehman faced an unprecedented loss as a result of having held on to
large positions in subprime and other lower-rated mortgage tranches when securitizing the
underlying mortgages. Losses accrued in lower-rated mortgage-backed securities throughout
2008, forcing it to sell 6 billion USD in assets, in turn its stock losing 73% of its value as the
credit market continued to tighten. In September 2008, Lehman announced a loss of 3.9
billion USD and its intent to sell off a majority stake in its investment-management business.
Lehman Brothers Holdings filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings with bank debt of 613
billion and bond debt of 155 billion.40 It filed in the UK, Japan and other jurisdictions.41 The
US government made a decision not to bail out Lehman’s and the collapse was a major
factor in precipitating a full scale financial crisis, given the highly interrelated nature of the
banking and financial products sector. The crisis quickly spiraled out of control, with
financial institutions and then businesses falling like dominos. One month later, the US
Congress enacted the Troubled Assets Recovery Program (TARP) of 700 billion USD to
purchase US bank toxic assets.
The massive injection of public funds during the height of the financial crisis was highly
contested in some jurisdictions. In the US and elsewhere, bail-outs did not include the kinds
of conditions imposed on the banks in the UK, and there was considerable public protest
that the bail-outs were occurring while executives continued to receive bonuses and working
people were losing their livelihood, their homes and their pension savings.
The global banking industry has wide variance in capital and governance structures, which
means that there is differing risk appetite and incentives to monitor management. Pre-crisis
rules on adequate internal controls, risk management and audit functions did not prevent
excessive risk taking. Once financial distress occurred, it became evident that there were few
structures and systems in place to address bank insolvency. The need for a regulatory
response to oversight of banks is evident, but the nature and extent of that response is a
complex issue, particularly in light of the wide variation in individual financial institutions
and the regulatory authorities that supervise their activities, and given recent, growing,
sovereign financial distress.
Basel II had created disclosure requirements covering quantitative and qualitative aspects of
overall capital adequacy and capital allocation, as well as risk exposure and assessment, all
with a view to promoting market discipline.42 Many of its provisions were not really
39
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implemented and others were deficient to address the above-identified problems.
In addition to the interbank dependency issues and the problems associated with
securitization, the international nature of banking was a factor. One of the benefits of the
EU passport system, fluidity of capital, is problematic on insolvency. Banks of member
states could establish branches without host country approval or supervision, which means
that if the supervisory oversight in the home jurisdiction is lacking, that risk is being
transferred to the depositors in host member states, with little or no regulatory oversight in
that host state. Recently adopted capital adequacy requirements face the same issue, in
respect of levels of capital adequacy being adopted in different EU member states.
In May 2010, European governments and the IMF provided a 750 billion Euro bailout
package.43 The European Central Bank started purchasing government bonds as a short term
stabilization strategy. 44 Its bond purchase program was to address the shutdown of the
covered bond market and support longer-term funding of banks and the financing of the
real economy in the euro area. In July 2010, 91 banks were evaluated, representing 65% of
the European Union's banking sector; of those, seven failed European bank stress tests.45
Concerns continue regarding the health of the European banking system, with many banks
dependent on the European Central Bank for financing.46 Conditions that accompanied the
bailouts tightened the definition of what banks could count as highest-quality “tier one
capital”, the main assets they hold to protect against losses. It also required lenders to hold
liquid assets sufficient to see them through a 30-day crisis and set a global leverage ratio to
limit overall bank borrowing.47 For example, the rescue package provided to Greece in 2010
by the IMF and Eurozone was €110 billion in funds,48 which included a €10 billion support
fund for the nation’s banks that faced rising bad loans as the economy was shrinking.49
Included in the package was the requirement that there be no debt restructuring; and that the
European Central Bank suspend the minimum credit rating required for the Greek
government-backed assets used in its liquidity operations.50
As a result of the bank failures and the massive bailouts, governments worldwide concluded
bonds issued by other firms; Donald P. Morgan, “Rating Banks: Risk and uncertainty in an opaque
industry,” The American Economic Review 92 (2002): 874-888; Giuliano Iannotta, “Testing for
Opaqueness in the European Banking Industry: Evidence from Bond Credit Ratings,” (SDA Bocconi
Working Paper No. 122/04, June 2004), http://ssrn.com/abstract=570483.
43
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45
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50
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that the effectiveness and intensity of supervision needs to be strengthened for banks,
particularly for systemically important institutions. The Financial Stability Board (FSB)
suggested that jurisdictions needed to strengthen supervisory mandates, independence,
resources and methods; and that core financial market infrastructures needed to be
reinforced to reduce contagion risks and to ensure that critical infrastructure is not itself a
source of systemic risk.51
The Basel Committee Financial Institutions 2010 Report found that the assumption that
institutions were too big or too interconnected to fail introduced additional risk and greater
likelihood of cross-border contagion. It found that prudential measures will not limit the
potential for increased moral hazard without instituting viable resolution processes for
financial institutions. It also found that contingency planning is important for cross-border
financial institutions to deal with financial distress, including cross-border cooperation and
information sharing. It advocated strengthening risk mitigation mechanisms that reduce
systemic risk and enhance resiliency of critical financial functions during a crisis.52
The G-20 leaders in November 2010 agreed on comprehensive financial sector reforms to
reduce the risk of future crises, strengthen banking systems and prevent a future need for
massive government bailouts. The FSB and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
conducted studies to evaluate the macroeconomic impact of the proposals, assessing the
benefits and costs of the initial transition period and of strengthening capital and liquidity
standards over a longer-term period when the proposals are fully implemented.53
ii.

Higher Capital and Liquidity Requirements

The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s measures to strengthen regulatory standards
for internationally active banks require banks to carry more capital and liquidity, designed to
improve the safety and robustness of the global financial system.
Basel III provides for a "macroprudential overlay" to better deal with systemic risk, with a
significant increase in the required level of capital; an increase in the quality of banks’ capital;
and a stricter definition of core capital. Basel III sets a new key capital ratio of 4.5 per cent.54
The reforms will increase the minimum common equity requirement from 2% to 4.5%.
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Another objective of Basel III is to reduce systemic risk by reducing procyclicality, i.e. the
financial system’s tendency to amplify the ups and downs of the real economy, taking
account of the inter-linkages and common exposures among financial institutions, especially
for those deemed systemically important. Banks will be required to hold a capital
conservation buffer of 2.5% to withstand future periods of stress.55 This countercyclical
buffer would build up during periods of rapid aggregate credit growth where national
authorities determine the growth is aggravating system-wide risk. The capital held in the
buffer could then be released in the downturn of the cycle, reducing the risk that available
credit would be constrained by regulatory capital requirements, and reducing the possibility
of an adverse cycle of losses and tightening of credit.56 While banks are allowed to draw on
the buffer during periods of financial distress, they will face restrictions on paying dividends
and discretionary bonuses.57 The introduction of capital buffers is intended to give banks, in
co-operation with supervisory authorities, greater scope to vary the amount of capital they
hold in response to economic circumstances.58 The countercyclical buffer capital is being
implemented according to national circumstances, to achieve the broader macroprudential
goal of protecting the banking sector.59 These capital requirements are supplemented by a
non-risk-based leverage ratio that will serve as a backstop to the risk-based measures.60
In Canada, the prudential supervisor had long required banks to establish internal targets to
provide an operating cushion against volatility and unexpected losses from risks, resulting in
higher capital than required under the Basel agreement. At the outset of the financial crisis,
the average Tier 1 capital ratio at Canadian banks was 10% and their total capital ratio was
almost 13%.61 All Canadian banks were able to maintain capital in excess of supervisory
targets, and none required a bailout. The Canadian experience illustrates the importance of
good capital adequacy ratios. It may also illustrate, however, that the amount currently set by
Basel III may not be sufficient to protect against a further serious banking crisis.
iii.
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Success Depends on Willingness to Implement
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One of the real challenges of international sources of law, such as Basel III, is to ensure that
they are implemented. They require action by national governments around the world.
Higher capital and liquidity requirements should result in lower-risk banks. The measures
should reduce the probability and severity of future financial crises; create smoother
economic cycles that allow economic growth; lower the risk of overinvestment problems due
to under-pricing of risk; and lower the incidence of spread of financial failure to the global
financial system.62 However, the Basel III requirements are dependent on countries’
willingness to implement the measures. The levels of capital adequacy were hotly contested
by some jurisdictions throughout the deliberations, resulting in reduction of the amounts
originally proposed; and there may be some unwillingness to implement even these
standards. One media report has suggested that the passport system is a big loophole to
escape higher capital requirements.63
In some instances, there is no capacity to meet the capital adequacy requirements,
particularly in some emerging Eastern European and other emerging nations. The World
Bank’s financing arm was undertaking contingency planning for failure of these nations to
meet the new standards, even as the ink was drying on Basel III.
Given the dynamic nature of financial markets, there is also a need for jurisdictions to be
committed to evaluating any changes on an ongoing basis, and to be responsive to the need
for further adjustment of capital and liquidity standards.
iv.

Issue of Who Pays

Despite the benefits, stronger prudential standards also impose costs on the economy, since
banks will pass on to their customers the higher costs of carrying more capital and liquidity.
The Bank of Canada has observed that if given enough time to meet the new capital
requirements by regulators and markets, banks can generate capital internally over time
through the retention of earnings; yet they will likely pass on the costs of the higher
standards to their customers by demanding higher interest spreads, increasing non-interest
fee income, or reducing operating expenses.64 They can also lower the risk-weighted asset
denominator of their regulatory capital requirements by slowing the growth of assets that do
not generate sufficient revenue to justify the extra capital charges; or they can raise additional
capital by issuing new shares to investors.65 Arguably, given the considerable returns that
bank investors enjoyed over the pre-crisis period, they should bear some of the costs of new
capital requirements through lower returns on their equity investment.66 The costs could also
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be borne in part by more modest compensation to senior officers, aligning their
compensation more directly to the quality of their prudential oversight and success in
maintaining the safety and soundness of the financial institution. Some combination of all
of these strategies may spread the costs over different types of stakeholders, rather than have
borrowers and depositors bear the costs.
Banks are likely to seek to maintain their return on equity over the longer run, yet the Bank
of Canada has observed that higher capital and liquidity requirements should make banks
less risky, thereby reducing the required rate of return on both bank debt and equity.67 It
observes that given the current exceptionally low level of bank deposit rates and the cost of
bank debt funding more generally, the wider interest margins will effectively result in higher
interest rates (lending spreads) on bank loans, which will be passed along to all bank
borrowers, not just to small and medium-sized businesses, because all banks will be affected
by the new requirements.68
A reduction in the supply of credit could affect the level of economic output during the
transition to the new standards. The macroeconomic effects of banks meeting higher capital
and liquidity requirements may mean that short-term business consumption and investment
expenditure will be dampened because higher interest margins and tighter lending
standards.69 However, these costs are likely an appropriate price to allow the system to adjust
to reduce overall systemic risk. Arguably it is a better approach than the tax-based bailouts
that essentially resulted in “privatization of gains” and the “socialization of losses”, which
placed the burden of bank failure on taxpayers, rather than the banking sector and its
decision makers.
v.

More Appropriate Supervisory Oversight

Banks and other financial institutions can shift their risk profile very quickly. Their exposure
to risk can also be altered by market developments even without specific actions on the part
of the bank. A bank’s holdings of financial assets, which include both debt and equity
securities and hybrid instruments, allows a bank to liquidate its long-term debt arrangements,
such as commercial and residential mortgages, and shift the value to new assets with a much
higher risk profile, creating inappropriate solvency risk. More appropriate supervisory
oversight would increase the likelihood that governance structures are in place to minimize
such risks.
A number of studies have identified a lacuna in supervisory oversight, in part because the
assumption was that the self governance set up under Basel II would result in directors and
officers controlling risk internally; and in part because of the difficulty in attracting and
15 to 20 per cent returns on shareholders’ equity, to adjust to the new rules; ibid. at 5.
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retaining expertise within supervisory authorities. In the UK, the FSA found there had been
limited understanding by its supervisory team of the duties contained in the regulator’s
“close and continuous” supervision model.70
The degree of regulatory oversight requires normative consideration of the extent to which
such oversight should be imposed by regulatory standards and supervision and the degree to
which regulation should promote governance practices that encourage compliance. Put more
bluntly, what is the degree to which the remedies to the agency issues in bank governance
should be privately driven or publicly imposed? In respect of financial institutions,
regulatory reform is highly influenced by the financial institutions themselves, as they have
considerable resources to press for regulatory structures that suit their direct interests.
Given that other stakeholders, such as depositors or insurance policy holders, may not have
the information, resources or capacity to participate in policy discussions regarding
regulatory reform, it is important that government build in these perspectives to the greatest
extent possible. Otherwise, the public interest aspects of financial institution oversight may
be lacking.
Oversight also needs to be highly dynamic, with an ability to assess its effectiveness and
respond in a timely way to changes in financial products, financial institution structures and
market changes. In this respect, there needs to be effective monitoring and assessment of
any regulatory changes, in order to assess whether they meet the public policy goals
articulated at the time they were introduced, and arguably, a deliberative public policy
discussion that accounts for the experience of both institutions and individuals. Such
processes may be more responsive to changes required, if sufficiently broad perspectives can
be brought to the deliberative process. The difficult question is what the appropriate degree
of regulatory oversight is that would reduce systemic risk as well as bank-specific risk, having
regard to the particular prudential nature of banks and similar financial institutions.
Black and Baldwin have suggested that regulators can attune the logics of risk analyses to the
complex problems and the dynamics of regulation in practice, arguing that regulators have to
regulate in a way that is responsive to five elements: regulated firms' behaviour, attitude, and
culture; regulation's institutional environments; interactions of regulatory controls; regulatory
performance; and change.71 They observe that there are strengths and limitations in using
risk-based regulation to manage risk and uncertainty within the constraints of practical
circumstances.72 These elements can be considered in discerning the degree to which
oversight is required to reduce systemic risk.
Given the nature of interests in financial institutions, the need for regulatory or supervisory
oversight is considerable. Deposit holders and life policy holders place their savings or
purchase their life insurance or annuities in order to assure some future economic security.
They do not factor in the risk of the bank or insurance company becoming insolvent in the
same way that arguably equity investors do. Unlike many equity investors, the depositor’s
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deposits or the policyholder’s life insurance is not invested disposable cash that the deposit
or policyholder can afford to lose. Arguably, there is a fiduciary obligation by the bank
officers, given the imbalance in power and vulnerable nature of most depositors and
policyholders. Hence, some of the arguments that investors should serve as a form of
discipline of managers through exit or voice are not applicable to such stakeholders of banks
and insurance companies. The prudential nature of the financial institution requires a higher
degree of oversight to ensure the safety and soundness of the financial institution, and to
protect the economic interests of these stakeholders. It also requires safety nets for
vulnerable depositors and life policyholders when regulatory oversight is not sufficient and a
financial institution becomes insolvent.
In this respect, one normative question is why much of the focus of addressing collapse of
banks has been “financial safety nets” for major banks, with less concern for broader social
safety nets for individuals and small businesses harmed by the governance failure of the
banks. The nature of banks also means that there are public interest aspects to bank
regulation, both in terms of overall system stability, and in terms of creating a system that
protects interests across a broad cross-section of society.
A number of jurisdictions have now recognized these issues. The UK announced measures
to enhance oversight; regulators are to perform an annual review of the business and
strategic plans of high impact firms, taking into account the stress testing carried out by the
firm, management actions, and the firm’s view of the likeliest scenarios that could threaten
its viability.73 Supervisors are to assess the robustness of the firm’s plans to maintain
adequate capital and liquidity. Supervisory authorities are also to increase the rigour of its
ongoing supervision under its risk mitigation program, and increase its focus and resources
on prudential supervision, including stress testing, to ensure that firms have appropriate risk
management systems and controls.74
A High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, chaired by Jacques de Larosière,
identified some serious shortcomings in the existing system of financial supervision in
Europe.75 It reported that banks operate across borders, but supervision remains mostly at
national level, uneven and often uncoordinated. Many technical rules are determined at
member state level, and there is considerable variation. Even where rules are harmonized,
application is inconsistent. It has observed that the fragmented supervision undermines the
EU single market, imposes extra costs for financial institutions, and increases the likelihood
of bank insolvency. The report concluded that a stronger financial sector in the EU in the
future must have convergence between member states on technical rules, and a mechanism
for ensuring agreement and co-ordination between national supervisors of the same crossborder institution. It proposed a rapid and effective mechanism to ensure consistent
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application of rules, as well as co-ordinated decision-making in emergency situations.
vi.

Strengthen National Bank Insolvency Resolution Frameworks

Bank of England Governor Mervyn King observed that “banks may be global in life, but
they are national in death”.76 Even where a financial institution has highly integrated debt
and asset structures, insolvency workouts are the jurisdiction of individual domestic
insolvency systems. There is a tension between international efforts to harmonize regulation
in global financial markets and the actual effects of bank failure on national systems, subject
to national laws, with the costs borne by taxpayer resources. Responses to bank failures need
to be timely and effective; and in the majority of cases, such responses will fall to national
regulators and national resolution schemes. Any regulatory innovation must be responsive to
these tensions.
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has noted that a lack of
provisions allowing refinancing and fair and equitable voting on a plan of reorganization are
among common weaknesses that should be addressed in future reform efforts.77 Mario
Draghi, Chair of the FSB, has observed that systemically important institutions will operate
with correct incentives only if an effective resolution framework is in place and that many
countries lack these powers, the tools and operational capacity. He suggests that statutory
powers enabling the resolution authority to bail-in senior debt holders would expand the
options for going concern resolution.78
The FSB is developing common principles to strengthen national resolution powers for
financially distressed financial institutions and to ensure firm-specific contingency planning;
suggesting that such principles will reduce contagion, help to achieve greater consistency
among national resolution frameworks, and improve coordination of resolution measures
across borders.79 It suggests that all jurisdictions should have in place a policy framework to
reduce the moral hazard risks associated with systemically important financial institutions in
their jurisdictions; and should have effective resolution tools that enable the authorities to
resolve financial firms without systemic disruptions and taxpayer losses. Effective resolution
schemes should include authority to facilitate a “going concern” capital and liability
restructuring as well as “gone concern” restructuring and wind-down, including measures
such as the establishment of a temporary bridge bank to take over and continue operating
certain essential functions.80 The G20 has subsequently agreed that every country should
have a rapid resolution mechanism for all systemically important financial institutions.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has recommended that: “National authorities
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should have appropriate tools to deal with all types of financial institutions in difficulties so
that an orderly resolution can be achieved that helps maintain financial stability, minimize
systemic risk, protect consumers, limit moral hazard and promote market efficiency. Such
frameworks should minimize the impact of a crisis or resolution on the financial system and
promote the continuity of systemically important functions. Examples of tools that will
improve national resolution frameworks are powers, applied where appropriate, to create
bridge financial institutions, transfer assets, liabilities, and business operations to other
institutions, and resolve claims.”81
1. UK Initiatives
Prior to 2008, the UK did not have a statutory regime for dealing with failing banks. The
Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008 temporarily provided the Treasury with powers to
facilitate an orderly resolution to maintain financial stability or protect the public interest.82
The UK then enacted the Banking Act, 2009, which establishes a permanent special
resolution regime (SRR), providing authorities with tools to deal with financially distressed
banks.83 There are three stabilization options: transfer to a private sector purchaser, transfer
to a bridge bank and transfer to temporary public sector ownership. The authority under the
Act includes the ability to effect the transfer of shares and other securities or property, rights
and liabilities; and assess any compensation payable to transferors for the shares or other
property transferred and for third parties affected by a transfer.84
The Banking Act, 2009 also establishes a new bank insolvency procedure, to provide for the
orderly winding up of a failed bank and the facilitating of rapid payments by the Financial
Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) to eligible claimants, or a transfer of such accounts
to another financial institution.85 There is a new bank administration procedure where there
has been a partial transfer of business from a failing bank. A bank administrator may be
appointed by the court to administer the affairs of an insolvent residual bank, created where
part of the bank has been transferred to a private sector purchaser or to a bridge bank under
the SRR.86
The Act formalizes the Bank of England’s role in the oversight of inter-bank payment
systems, given the inter-linkages between payment systems, banks and other financial
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intermediaries, where payment systems problems have the potential to spread through the
financial system.87 The Act gives the Treasury considerable authority to make regulations
concerning the fiscal consequences of the exercise of any stabilisation power, including the
ability to modify an enactment with retrospective effect for up to three months prior to the
date on which the stabilisation power was exercised.88 The Treasury also has authority to
amend the law retroactively for the purpose of facilitating the Act’s special resolution
objectives, where desirable or necessary to give effect to the particular exercise of its power
under the statute.89 The Government can introduce, if needed, a new insolvency regime for
investment banks, designed to secure the expeditious return of client assets following the
failure of an investment banking institution.90
2. New European Union Framework
On 22 September 2010, the European Parliament, following agreement by all member states,
approved a new supervisory framework for financial regulation in Europe, effective January
2011. The European Commission (EC) has set out a framework for dealing with bank
insolvency and future crises in the financial sector.91 In particular, it will provide a
supervisory framework to allow banks to fail without bringing down the entire financial
system, or risking that taxpayers are called on to pay the costs. It is part of the larger G20
strategy that no bank should be "too big or too interconnected to fail”. Legislative proposals
in 2011 encourage all member states to put in place an efficient crisis management regime,
including tools to address bank crises at an early stage. The measures include:
o Preparatory and preventative measures, such as a requirement that institutions prepare
bank recovery and resolution plans to ensure adequate planning for financial stress or
failure, what the EC has called "living wills".
o Powers to take early action to remedy problems before they become severe, such as
powers for supervisors to require the replacement of management, require institutions to
adopt changes to business operations and/or corporate structure necessary to ensure
that resolution is viable; requirements to limit or modify exposures; or to require an
institution to implement a recovery plan or to divest itself of activities or business lines
that pose an excessive risk to its financial soundness. 92 Supervisors' powers will include
powers to prohibit payment of dividends.
87

Payment systems are networks involving sets of rules, procedures and arrangements for the electronic
transfer of money or credit between participating members of the systems. In some cases, payment systems
are embedded in clearing and settlement systems for transferring securities and these involve payments in
relation to the securities. The Bank of England performs a non-statutory role of the oversight of inter-bank
payment systems, in particular promoting the robustness and resilience of key UK payment systems. The
FSA continues to have statutory responsibility for the regulation of recognized clearing houses and
investment exchanges. Ibid.
88
Banking Act, 2009, s. 74, subject to an affirmative resolution procedure.
89
Banking Act, 2009, s. 75, subject to an affirmative resolution procedure or a negative resolution
procedure, giving the Treasury considerably more authority.
90
Ibid., sections 232-236, any such regulations will be subject to a review within a period of two years after
coming into force.
91
European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/crisis_management/index_en.htm.
92
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/crisis_management/index_en.htm ; October 20, 2010.

19

o Resolution tools, such as powers to effect the takeover of a failing bank or a solvent
institution, or to transfer all or part of its business to a temporary bridge bank, which
would enable authorities to ensure the continuity of essential services and to manage the
failure in an orderly way.
o The EC has also set out its ideas for pre-funded bank resolution funds to ensure that the
banking sector, and not the taxpayer, pays the costs of future bank failures.
The EC Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) currently provides early intervention powers
for prudential supervisors to impose measures on banks that fail to meet requirements of the
Directive; however, those powers will be enhanced.93 Each member state will identify a
resolution authority to exercise the resolution powers. The EC will require the annual
preparation of a supervisory program for each bank on the basis of a risk assessment; greater
and more systematic use of on-site supervisory examinations; more robust standards and
more intrusive and forward-looking supervisory assessment.94 The objective is to allow
authorities to take action before a bank is balance sheet insolvent.
An outstanding issue is what is the threshold for intervention? Should it be a requirement
that an institution be in serious distress without any realistic prospects of recovery in a
specified timeframe?95 The EC has suggested that possible threshold conditions aimed at the
solvency of an institution include an assessment by supervisors that the bank has incurred or
is likely to incur losses that will deplete its regulatory capital; that its assets are likely to be
less than its liabilities; that it is likely to be unable to pay its obligations in the normal course
of business; or it does not have adequate resources to carry on its business; or a supervisory
assessment that the institution no longer meets, or is expected to fail to meet, the conditions
of its licence to carry on banking.96 There will also be a public interest test, such as “if
winding up the institution under ordinary insolvency proceedings did not ensure the stability
of the financial system or continuity of essential financial infrastructure services”, then the
institution should be wound up once the threshold for insolvent liquidation is reached.97
The EC has observed that it will not always be feasible to liquidate a bank under ordinary
insolvency proceedings.98 In some cases, an orderly winding down through resolution will be
necessary in the public interest, for reasons of financial stability, to minimize contagion,
ensure continuity of vital economic functions, maximize the value of remaining assets and
facilitate their return to productive use in the private sector. It suggests that measures aimed
at maintaining the entity as a going concern, such as the power to write down debt or
convert it to equity, should be a last resort. Where banks are at a point of failure, the three
options are: ordinary liquidation, including sale of all or part of the business; orderly wind-up
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of a gone-concern, and restructuring as a going concern.99 Resolution powers should include
a bridge bank tool that would enable authorities to transfer some or all the business of a
failing bank, including its deposits, to a temporary bridge bank;100 an asset separation tool to
enable authorities to transfer underperforming or 'toxic' assets to a separate vehicle (“bad
bank”) in order to “cleanse” the balance sheet of a troubled bank; powers to write off or
cancel shares; a tool to write down or convert debt of a failing bank; and power to impose a
temporary moratorium on the payment of claims.101 The EC’s guiding principle for
compensation is that affected stakeholders should suffer no greater loss than they would
have if the institution had been wound up under the applicable insolvency regime.102
The overriding objective of the EC initiative is to ensure that banks can fail without
jeopardizing wider financial stability, thus minimizing the risk of contagion. It is also aimed
at ensuring continuous access for depositors to their accounts, the underlying notion being
that essential banking services must continue even if a bank is allowed to fail. Under the
proposal, national funds should be set up on the basis of contributions paid by banks, to
fund the cost of future bank resolution measures and facilitate advance planning on how the
costs of resolving cross-border institution distress should be shared without imposing costs
on the tax base.103 Such funds are aimed at the moral hazards associated with government
bail-outs.104
The EC has also recognized the challenge of branch banks under the EU passport system by
proposing that there must be arrangements to allow authorities to effectively coordinate and
cooperate as fully as possible in cross-border bank insolvency proceedings.
The framework consists of a new European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) to monitor and
assess potential threats to financial stability that arise from macro-economic developments
and from developments within the financial system as a whole. The ESRB is to provide
early warning of system-wide risks that may be building up, given cross-sectoral and
interconnected banks, and, where necessary, issue recommendations for action to deal with
these risks. The framework also consists of three new European Supervisory Authorities
(ESA) for the financial services sector, retooled from pre-crisis authorities: a European
Banking Authority (EBA) based in London, a European Insurance and Occupational
Pensions Authority (EIOPA) in Frankfurt, and a European Securities and Markets Authority
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(ESMA) in Paris. The new authorities will be made up of the 27 national supervisors. The
new European Supervisory Authorities, and in particular, the European Banking Authority,
have coordination and support roles in crisis situations.
The ESA will undertake micro-prudential supervision, working with the existing national
supervisory authorities to safeguard financial soundness at the level of individual financial
firms and protect consumers of financial services. It will have the power to draw up specific
rules for national authorities and financial institutions; develop technical standards and
guidelines; monitor how rules are being enforced by national supervisory authorities; take
action in emergencies, including the banning of certain products; mediate and settle disputes
between national supervisors; ensure the consistent application of EU law, and, where
necessary, settle disagreements between national authorities in areas that require cooperation,
coordination or joint decision-making by member state supervisory authorities.105
The banking proposals are part of a broader initiative to regulate financial services in the
future.106 The EC has observed that in order to strengthen the reforms of the European
supervisory architecture, a single European rulebook is needed to provide a common legal
basis for supervisory action in the EU, in turn enhancing stability, equal treatment, lower
compliance costs and a reduction in opportunities for regulatory arbitrage.107 Day-to-day
supervision of banks will continue at the national level. The EC is to publish a report every
three years on the functioning of the new authorities and assess whether further steps are
needed to ensure the prudential soundness of institutions and protection of depositors,
policy-holders and investors.108
The new Authorities will be able to make decisions directly applicable to financial
institutions as a last resort where the Authority has asked the national supervisor to act and it
has not complied; to be done only in cases where there is directly applicable EU legislation.
The regulations establishing the new Authorities have a “fiscal safeguard clause”, which
prohibits them from taking any decisions that impinge on the fiscal responsibilities of
member states. The Authorities may temporarily prohibit or restrict certain financial
activities that threaten the orderly functioning, integrity or stability of the whole or part of
the financial system in Europe.109 Thus the balance between member state autonomy and
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the authority of these new entities to act in specified circumstances for the benefit of the
European financial system is a fragile one.
The new Authorities will also participate actively in the development and coordination of
effective and consistent recovery and resolution plans, guarantee schemes, procedures in
emergency situations and preventive measures to minimize the systemic impact of any
failure.110 Their goal is to have a specialized and ongoing capacity to respond effectively to
the materialization of systemic risks.
The overriding objective of a European resolution framework is that distressed banks of any
type and size should be allowed to fail without risk to financial stability, at the same time,
avoiding costs to taxpayers. The EC’s framework for prevention, crisis management and
resolution is aimed at:
o Making prevention and preparation a priority, through comprehensive planning and
preventive measures that help authorities and firms prepare for resolution.
o Early supervisory intervention, by providing tools to resolve institutions in a way that
minimizes risks of contagion and ensures continuity of essential financial services.
o Enabling timely and decisive action, through well defined powers and processes
addressing when and to what extent authorities can intervene.
o Reducing moral hazard by ensuring that the costs of resolution should be borne by
bank shareholders and, where needed, creditors, reflecting the normal hierarchy of
claims. If necessary, the banking industry as a whole should bear the costs.
o Contributing to a smooth resolution of cross-border groups to ensure minimum
disruption to the internal market, including fair sharing of costs and preservation of
essential banking services.
o Ensuring legal certainty, appropriate safeguards for third parties and restricting any
interference with property rights to what is necessary and justified in the public
interest. Creditors should receive treatment similar to what they would receive on a
winding-up.
o Limiting competition distortions that could result from interventions. State aid
granted under the resolution framework is to be compatible with the Treaty rules and
the internal market.111
The European Commission is considering supplementary mechanisms designed to enable
large complex financial institutions (LCFI) to continue as a going concern, so that they can
be reorganized or, where appropriate, have certain activities wound down in an orderly
manner that minimizes contagion and protects financial stability. One option is to write
down all equity and the conversion of the debt of a troubled bank into equity, to restore its
capital position to allow it to continue as a going concern temporarily or permanently.112
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However, the EC has not yet resolved a number of policy questions, such as: should there be
statutory power for authorities to write down or convert debt under specified conditions, or
mandatory contractual terms for write down or conversion that would be required to be
included in a proportion of the debt issued by financial institutions;113 the impact on the cost
of financing and the need to regulate the liabilities side of the balance sheet; the complexities
of applying this tool to a cross-border group, and the need to ensure recognition of any write
down or conversion by foreign courts where the debt governed by the law of a non-EU
jurisdiction. The Basel Committee has suggested that if home and host authorities deem
that a bank’s structure is too complex to be resolved in an orderly way, they should demand
changes to its legal and operational structure.114 Such a proposal may be unlikely to be
adopted, absent shared goals and a shared framework for resolution of bank insolvency.
The EC has observed that an integrated framework for resolution of cross-border entities by
a single European body would deliver a rapid, decisive and equitable resolution process for
European financial groups, but that it would be difficult to establish an EU integrated
resolution model for cross-border banking groups in the absence of a harmonized
insolvency regime and of a single European supervisory authority for those entities.
Thus, the EC has proposed a coordination framework based on a network of harmonized
resolution tools and a requirement for authorities to consult and cooperate when resolving
affiliated entities. There are to be “resolution colleges”, where supervisors and national
authorities in charge of resolution would meet for the purposes of crisis planning and the
preparation of resolution plans.115 It suggests that group level resolution authorities should
have the power to decide in cases of group failure whether a group resolution scheme is
appropriate; and pending any decision, national authorities would be required to refrain from
adopting national measures that could prejudice the effectiveness of the group resolution
scheme.116 The production of a group resolution scheme in appropriate cases is aimed at
facilitating coordinated resolution; but the EC observes that because resolution powers are
applied to individual legal entities and the competence for resolution would remain national,
the group resolution scheme would not be binding.117 The EC also advocates development
of firm specific cooperation agreements between the national authorities responsible for
managing the failure of global firms, with a view to ensuring effective planning, decisionmaking and coordination in respect of international groups globally.118
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The EC is considering measures that would specify the circumstances and conditions under
which institutions may transfer assets within a group, including in situations where group
entities are experiencing liquidity stress; to establish an enabling framework for intra-group
liquidity management that includes safeguards to preserve financial stability in member states
where transferring entities are established, and to protect the rights of creditors and
shareholders.119
The EC has observed that its requirement to prepare a recovery plan should be applied
proportionately, reflecting the size of the firm, the nature of its sources of funding and the
degree to which group or other sectoral support would be credibly available.120 Institutions
would be required to submit plans to supervisors for assessment of comprehensiveness and
ability to restore the viability of the institution. The requirement for up to date resolution
plans at both the entity and group level would apply to all credit institutions covered by the
regime, with the aim of ensuring the planning necessary to enable the bank’s business to be
transferred or wound down in an orderly manner in the event of its failure.121 Resolution
plans would require details on group structure, intra-group guarantees and service level
agreements, contracts and counterparties, debt liabilities, custody arrangements, as well as
operational information about IT systems and human resources. The EC has noted that
powers to change the bank’s group legal structure and business arrangements are intrusive,
and appropriate checks and balances will be necessary, including a right for the firm to
challenge any requirement for restructuring imposed by the resolution authority.122 Any
provision of financing in support of resolution, including capital, liquidity, guarantees or
other measures, must comply with the EU Treaty and the state aid framework where it
involves the use of state resources and where an advantage could distort competition and
affect intra-EU trade.123
These initiatives recognize the challenges of coordinating cross-border proceedings.
Essentially, if banks and other financial institutions want the ability to operate in the EU,
they will have to bear the costs of preventive planning and ongoing reporting of risks and
recovery plans. The transparency and reporting requirements impose substantial transaction
costs on financial institutions; however, arguably the costs are appropriate given both the
costs of the recent bailouts and the continuing risks associated with their failure to be
prudent in their banking activities. The new structures assume good faith compliance by
individual financial institutions across state borders, which may not be what will occur in
practice.
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EU banks will be required to contribute to ex ante funds, backed by financing arrangements
to ensure that financing is available irrespective of the size of a failed bank; and any costs
exceeding the capacity of the fund will be subsequently recovered from the banking sector.124
Each resolution fund will receive contributions from banks licensed in the same member
state, and the contribution would cover their branches established in other member states.
The EC would prefer full harmonization based primarily on liabilities as a proxy for the
costs of resolution, however, it is also considering whether Member States should be given
the flexibility to decide on a different basis for contributions, if it would not distort the EU
market. The EC has recognized that there is a need to “calibrate the size of harmonized
national funds in view of the burdens imposed by other financial sector reforms”, phasing in
funds as the economy recovers.125
Bank oversight must be accompanied by initiatives in related areas of financial and capital
markets. The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) has
recommended strengthening its oversight to include identifying and addressing systemic
risks; cooperating in development and promotion of adherence to consistent standards of
regulation, oversight and enforcement in order to protect investors, encourage fair and
efficient markets and reduce systemic risk.126
In the midst of these policy reforms in the euro area, the European Central Bank, in order to
meet banks’ increased demand for liquidity and to reduce uncertainty, introduced an
“enhanced credit support” policy, which included the introduction of new long-term
refinancing operations and extended the list of collateral eligible for monetary policy
operations.127 By allowing banks to continue rolling-over their short and medium-term
financing, the liquidity provision of the ECB avoided a fire-sale of assets.128 The ECB has
observed that during the initial stages of the crisis, the policy response to the crisis involved
a transfer of risk from the private sector to the government sector; however, as deficits
surged and it become evident that government deficit in countries such as Greece were
much larger than previously understood, the attention focused more on the state of public
finance and the difficulty in pricing sovereign debt risk. It notes that after the downgrading
of Greek bonds by the major rating agencies, the financial crisis that originated in the US
turned into a sovereign debt crisis with a European epicentre.129 Europe now faces pressing
concerns regarding the ability of some euro area countries to honour their debt obligations,
and policy measures are required to stabilize the financial sector, a discussion that space does
not permit here. The ECB observes that slower than expected recovery and overstretched
public finances have made investors and consumers retrench in 2011 and in order to diffuse
tensions in the euro area secondary sovereign bond market, the ECB in August resumed
some of its exceptional liquidity programs. It notes that “The fundamental reason for this
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public role is that private agents, typically, are not large enough players to internalize the
general equilibrium – or even market specific – consequences of their portfolio decisions (as
in the case of fire sales). These results warrant ample liquidity injections by central banks and
underpin the current wave of regulatory reforms undertaken in the European Union as well
as.”
Thus notwithstanding many policy initiatives, EU banks are currently facing sharp rises in
borrowing costs and considerably reduced access to financial markets. Combined with high
levels of sovereign debt and a slowing global economy, there may be a new wave of bank
insolvencies and contagion internationally. The EC initiatives have not yet allowed it to gain
control of the euro zone financial crisis. Moreover, while the policy commitment is one of a
centralized support strategy for bank and sovereign debt, there are rising tensions between
countries that have surpluses, such as Germany, and countries that have huge account
deficits, such as Greece and Ireland. The European Central Bank can supply considerable
liquidity to European banks, but it is a short-term bridging measure that cannot remedy the
continuing financial situation. There is a need to create comprehensive financial reforms;
adopt significant changes to fiscal policies; implement sustainable government debt; and
address problems associated with the EU’s inflexible exchange rates. Canada’s central bank
has argued that what is needed now is a comprehensive capital plan for European banks,
including a sizeable funding backstop for European sovereigns, suggesting that European
authorities need time to recreate their monetary union based on credible fiscal arrangements
and more flexible economies.130
3. US Reforms
In the US, the Dodd-Frank Act has established a resolution framework for systemic
institutions at a group level.131 A massive piece of legislation, it assigns oversight
responsibility to numerous government agencies and requires the promulgation of several
hundred additional rules. The Act is aimed at ending taxpayer funds to bail out financial
firms by creating a mechanism to liquidate failed banks, creating capital and leverage
requirements that make it undesirable to get too big. The legislation changes the Federal
Reserve’s emergency lending authority to allow system-wide support, but prohibits bailing
out an individual company.132 The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) can
borrow only the amount of funds to liquidate a bank that it expects to be repaid from the
assets liquidated, with the government holding a priority claim for repayment.133 The Dodd-
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Frank Act strengthens oversight and empowers regulators to aggressively pursue financial
fraud, conflicts of interest and manipulation of the system.
The reforms create a council to identify, provide advance warning and address systemic risks
posed by large, complex companies, products, and activities before they threaten the stability
of the economy.134 It also is aimed at eliminating loopholes that allow what it calls “risky and
abusive practices” to go unregulated, including in the OTC and asset-backed securities
markets. The Financial Stability Oversight Council will monitor systemic risk and make
recommendations to the Federal Reserve for stricter rules for capital, leverage, liquidity, risk
management and other requirements as companies grow in size and complexity. The
Council is mandated to create enhanced prudential standards for systemically important
firms. It can require a large, complex company to divest some of its holdings if it poses a
“grave threat” to the financial stability of the US, although the mechanism is considered a
“last resort” type of authority. 135 Large bank holding companies that have received TARP
funds will not be able to avoid Federal Reserve supervision by dropping their banks.136 It
requires regulators to implement regulations for banks, their affiliates and holding
companies, to limit relationships with hedge funds and private equity funds.137 The reforms
provide a specific framework for promoting uniform risk-management standards for
systemically important financial market utilities and clearing and settlement activities of
financial institutions.138
The Dodd-Frank Act also contains provisions on derivatives and oversight of hedge funds
and credit rating agencies, and provisions regarding say on executive pay, with the plan to
develop regulatory restrictions to prohibit compensation that encourage excessive risktaking. Of note is that the statute adds credit exposure from derivative transactions to banks’
lending limits. The derivatives issues are particularly complex, and arguably, the reforms
have done little to temper the speculative aspects of the market. The Bank for International
Settlements reports that the market for OTC derivatives in 2010 was still thriving, with 582
trillion USD in total notional amount of outstanding derivatives.139 Among the important
issues in respect of derivatives that have not been addressed to date is the fact that
derivatives are not subject to the mandatory stay under insolvency law, arguably giving such

134

Through a new Office of Financial Research, it will collect and analyze data to identify and monitor
emerging risks to the US economy and make this information public in periodic reports and testimony to
Congress every year. Ibid.
135
The Council will be chaired by the Treasury Secretary and include the Federal Reserve Board, SEC,
CFTC, OCC, FDIC, FHFA, NCUA, the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and an independent
appointee with insurance expertise. It will make recommendations to the Federal Reserve for increasingly
strict rules for capital, leverage, liquidity, risk management and other requirements as companies grow in
size and complexity, with significant requirements on companies that pose risks to the financial system. It
is authorized to require, with a 2/3 vote and vote of the chair, that a nonbank financial company be
regulated by the Federal Reserve if the council believe there would be negative effects on the financial
system if the company failed or its activities would pose a risk to the financial stability of the US.
136
Ibid.
137
The so-named “Volcker” rule.
138
Federal Reserve, supra.
139
For a discussion of the problems associated with derivatives in the insolvency context, see Janis Sarra,
Credit Derivatives Market Design, Creating Fairness and Sustainability, (London: Network for Sustainable
Financial Markets, 2008). Bank for International Settlements, www.bis.org/statistics.

28
products an inappropriate preference on the insolvency of the financial institution and
perhaps reducing the potential effectiveness of bank resolution schemes.140
The new US legislation requires large, complex financial companies to periodically submit
plans for their rapid and orderly shutdown should the company go under, on potential
sanction of higher capital requirements and restrictions on growth, activity and divestment,
should they fail to submit acceptable plans. It creates an orderly liquidation mechanism for
FDIC to unwind failing systemically significant financial companies. Shareholders and
unsecured creditors are to bear the losses instead of taxpayers; and management and
culpable directors will be removed. It requires that Treasury, FDIC and the Federal Reserve
all agree to put a company into the orderly liquidation process to mitigate serious adverse
effects on financial stability.141
The effects of the more than a thousand pages of legislative reforms in the US will not be
evident for some time; they require several hundred rules to be promulgated and brought
into force. Overall, the bank-related reforms are aimed at increased supervisory oversight of
financial institutions. There do not challenge the underlying structure of the industry or its
incentive effects in any substantive manner. This fact has become evident recently as the US
has embarked on its efforts to move from public support to private sector support, but
arguably, the shift is not properly supported by private market capital, which is still
experiencing the effects of the negative shocks from the financial crisis.142
In terms of the new US bank resolution provisions, Stephen Lubben has observed that the
insolvency liquidation provisions under Dodd-Frank are more akin to liquidation under
Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code than the Code’s Chapter 7 liquidation provisions, and in
that respect, do not really put an end to “too big to fail”.143 He suggests that regulators’
willingness to enforce the “living will” recovery plans prior to financial distress will have a
large impact on whether or not the orderly liquidation procedures will be effective. He
observes that orderly liquidation of a financial institution is dependent on FDIC’s ability to
provide ongoing liquidity and thus amounts to a form of public bailout. However, it may be
necessary, given the complexity and interdependency of financial institutions. Lubben
suggests that the speed with which the process can take place and the availability of
financing are two important aspects of the new regime, particularly since the private sector is
unlikely in many cases to be able to provide the interim financing that a bank of any
substantial size would require during the process.144 FDIC financing will prevent the bank’s
financial distress to spread to counter-parties. However, Lubben suggests that the lack of
clarity in when the provisions can or should be accessed has created unneeded uncertainty
with regard to the resolution of distressed financial institutions.145
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4. Summary
Overall, these reforms address a number of the issues raised by the lack of appropriate bank
resolution schemes. The policy discussions draw on broad notions of the public interest in
viable but stable financial markets and the need to protect vulnerable participants. Safety and
soundness of financial institutions is viewed as absolutely vital to financial and economic
markets. Yet the reforms are limited in their scope. They fail to fully comprehend the role
of derivatives in financial markets, and thus related reforms are directed towards disclosure
and central clearing and settlement systems rather than addressing the profound impact such
products have on insolvency resolution processes. They do not address the speculative and
distributive features of such products and the interrelationship of those features with bank
solvency and protection of vulnerable stakeholders. There is also, arguably, still insufficient
attention being paid to the issue of who pays for the safety and soundness of the system and
at what point that payment is made, in the form of capital requirements, prefunding of
deposit guarantee funds and bank resolution funds, the use of various products and tools,
and the incentives created for particular kinds of self-dealing or speculative conduct.
vii.

Adoption of a Framework for Cross-Border Bank Corporate Groups and Financial Conglomerates

There is also a pressing need to improve cross-border resolution capacity. Global banks have
substantial operations across multiple jurisdictions and thousands of legal entities. In the
absence of a global resolution regime, there needs to be enhanced capacity to co-ordinate
cross-border restructuring plans for international financial institutions. Such capacity needs
to recognize the wide variance in both the structure of financial institutions and in the
various jurisdictions’ normative commitments to rehabilitation or liquidation as the preferred
outcome of insolvent financial institution insolvency.
A number of financial institutions also have subsidiaries in more than one segment of the
financial sector, forming part of large financial conglomerates. A financial conglomerate has
been defined by the Basel Committee as a group of companies under common control, in
which the exclusive or predominant activities consist of providing significant services in two
or more financial sectors such as banking and insurance.146 Most domestic bank and
insolvency legislation fails to adequately recognize either the cross-border nature of financial
institution insolvency or the structure of the industry in terms of its cross-sector holdings.
Most do not offer any guidance as to how a proceeding involving such entities would
address the need to deal with multiple types of stakeholders and claims, located in different
jurisdictions, with differing statutory priorities given to claims, and involving multiple
compensation funds.
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Bank groups and financial conglomerates often have highly interconnected debt and asset
structures. Even where a domestic financial firm is not insolvent, it can be affected by the
insolvency of related entities. There should be a model banking law, similar to the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on CrossBorder Insolvency. The UNCITRAL Model Law, although not expressly prohibiting its
application to financial institutions, does contain a provision that suggests that the law can
exclude entities such as banks from the ambit of the provisions;147 and most jurisdictions
that have adopted the Model Law have done so. Any such model banking law or guidelines
could adopt the express objectives of the UNCITRAL Model Law; specifically, to provide
mechanisms for dealing with cross-border cooperation between courts and bank authorities;
the fair and efficient administration of cross-border insolvencies that protects the interests of
creditors, debtors, and other interested persons; the protection and the maximization of the
value of debtors’ property; and the rescue of financially troubled businesses to protect
investment and preserve employment. Any principles addressing cross-border insolvency
should account for the particular structure of the banking sector. The objectives should be
refined to recognize depositors and compensation funds as important stakeholders.
Under the UNCITRAL Model Law, the court has broad powers to grant post-recognition
relief, where satisfied that it is necessary for the protection of the debtor’s property or the
interests of creditors; and it has authority to impose whatever terms and conditions it deems
appropriate.148 There is a list of the forms of cooperation that may be provided between
representatives involved in the proceedings, including the appointment of a person to act at
the direction of the court; court-to-court communication; coordination of the administration
and supervision of the debtor’s assets and affairs; and coordination of proceedings or of
concurrent proceedings.149 Adoption for purposes of the financial sector should also include
depositors and other stakeholders of the financial institution as part of the criteria that the
court would consider. The Model Law is largely a procedural mechanism to allow crossborder cooperation, but it does have substantive protections, such as allowing the courts to
decline approval of an action where it is manifestly contrary to the public policy of the
jurisdiction. UNCITRAL has recently promulgated guidelines on the treatment of business
enterprise groups in insolvency, which may assist in formulating similar guidance for
financial conglomerates.150
Financial conglomerates are exposed to risks related to controlling a group, including
contagion risk. The EC is also considering reform of oversight of financial conglomerates,
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which requires amendment to Directive 2002/87/EC ('FICOD'), which in 2003 introduced
group-wide supplementary supervision.151 The objective of the Directive was to control
potential risks arising from “double gearing”, which is the multiple use of capital across
different sectors such as banking and insurance. It was to offer additional supervision where
there were group risks due to risk of contagion, management complexity, concentration, and
conflicts of interest that may arise when several licenses for different financial services are
combined.152
During the financial crisis, group risks materialized all across the financial sector,
emphasizing the importance of supervision of inter-linkages within financial groups.153 The
EC has observed that effective supervision of conglomerates differs across sectors,
increasing the need for robust supervision of financial conglomerates. Certain smaller EU
financial groups with a simple structure and few licenses in both sectors may be excluded
from supplementary supervision, reducing their compliance costs.154 Compliance costs for
bigger groups, with more than hundred licenses, active in both sectors, could increase as
such groups, representing about €9 trillion assets in the financial sector, are likely to be
included in the scope of the supplementary supervision.155 Increased compliance costs could
also be incurred by financial conglomerates. The EC states that the primary aim of this
proposal is to fix gaps that have evolved in supplementary supervision due to definitions in
the sectoral directives such as the CRD and the insurance directives.156 In order to ensure
that the necessary supervisory tools can be applied, it will introduce the term 'mixed financial
holding company' into the relevant provisions on consolidated/group supervision in the
sectoral directives.157 To date, consistent treatment under supplementary supervision has
been hampered by the lack of relevant information to properly assess group risks.158
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The EC also proposes to amend its Directive on insurance and reinsurance groups to
include mixed financial holding companies.159 It has observed that comprehensive
monitoring of group risks in large, complex, internationally operating conglomerates, is only
possible when competent authorities gather supervisory information and plan supervisory
measures beyond the national scope of their mandate.160
One mechanism that has proven helpful in dealing with cross-border insolvencies of
corporate groups in sectors outside of the financial sector are the use of protocols, which are
cross-border agreements of the principal parties to the proceeding, endorsed by the courts of
the jurisdictions where there are proceedings, which set out a series of procedures for notice,
stakeholder participation, the relationship of insolvency professionals in different
jurisdictions, and court-to-court cooperation and communication.161 Such protocols could be
helpful for cross-border proceedings of financial conglomerates where the insolvency
engages multiple insolvency statutes, given the different nature of entities within the financial
conglomerate.
III.

Bank Corporate Governance

The corporate governance of banks and other financial institutions differs from the
governance of corporations because of prudential regulation, banks’ significance to the
financial system, the different nature of stakeholders with investments at risk, and the
existence of deposit insurance. Bank governance also differs because banks’ liquidity
producing function is based on maturity mismatches, but depends on continued access to
liquidity from deposits, turnover of commercial paper and interbank lending.162 Leverage in
banks has different implications from that of corporations, and governance decisions must
take account of these important distinctions.
When a bank is experiencing liquidity problems or financial distress, its shareholders have
incentive to encourage higher risk strategies, because they enjoy any upside value generated
by the strategies and do not bear the consequences of downside as their investments are
already at risk or lost. Even shareholders with substantial block holding positions in banks,
often in European jurisdictions, may not have the incentive to monitor managers, where
their interests are already underwater. Governance structures fail to account for the residual
treatments of assets. Third, the threshold conditions, given their fixed amounts, are not risk-based, and very
small groups with a few licenses in each sector are subject to supplementary supervision, while the largest
most complex groups can technically be identified as not being a conglomerate. Ibid.
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interest in the financial institution at that point, which is held by depositors and creditors.
Restructuring can take many forms, some of which may address governance problems that
created or contributed to the financial distress and others that may not. Workouts can
involve a compromise of claims, a restructuring of debt and equity, forbearance and
renegotiated terms of credit, sale of part or all of the business to new equity holders through
stalking horse processes or credit bidding, and/or replacing directors and officers and
implementing new governance structures. The underlying premise is that if there is a viable
business plan that enhances the overall value of the bank’s business and offers greater
protection to economic stakeholders, then there should be a mechanism to remedy
governance problems and facilitate such a plan.
In the myriad of reports generated in the first year of the financial crisis, the corporate
governance of banks was not mentioned. However, in 2009, the Larosière Report concluded
that banks’ corporate governance was one of the most important failures underlying the
crisis.163 Boards of directors had failed to understand the nature or scale of risks and thus
were ineffective in their monitoring and oversight. There was a lack of effective control
mechanisms that contributed significantly to excessive risk taking; and the polycentric nature
of financial regulation created a gap in oversight of bank corporate governance.164
The opaque nature of many structured financial products meant that directors in their
decision making regarding managerial compensation were rewarding conduct that ran
counter to the bank’s stability and soundness. Moreover, derivatives held by banks were very
sensitive to exogenous factors that increased risks without decisions to do so by directors;
hence, directors and officers were often not in control of the risk profile.165 Banks are
heavily dependent on the confidence of depositors and creditors in their governance, and the
failure of confidence arising out of the liquidity shortages made them subject to runs on the
bank.
An independent review of corporate governance in the UK banking industry by the UK
government also found that there were serious deficiencies in governance and prudential
oversight in the period before the crisis.166 Due to the opaqueness of banks’ balance sheets,
incentive contracts with managers were ineffective in aligning the interests of managers and
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shareholders.167 The study reported that boards of directors found it difficult to assess
whether management actually met their performance targets, concluding that where a
significant amount of management’s total remuneration is equity based, managers will focus
on short-term results and have an incentive to increase the bank’s leverage.168
Some of the largest bank failures indicate governance concerns. At Northern Rock, directors
either acquiesced or were culpable in their failure of oversight. The UK Financial Services
Authority fined David Jones, former finance director of Northern Rock PLC £320,000 and
imposed a ban for continued misreporting on a monthly basis to the bank’s assets and
liabilities committee and, on a quarterly basis, to the Council of Mortgage Lenders.169 There
were also warning signals regarding Lehman’s governance prior to its collapse; and
subsequent to its failure, the court-appointed examiner found financial reporting
manipulation.170
i.

Bank Governance Reform

Whatever one’s normative perspective on the degree of regulatory intervention required, the
events of the past two years indicate that some further development in respect of bank
governance is required, which likely should involve both enhanced supervisory oversight and
a more nuanced model of bank self governance. The degree to which the private financial
services sector should remedy the identified governance problems continues to be hotly
contested.
After the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, World
Bank and other transnational organizations developed principles and standards of effective
governance.171 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision observes that from “a banking
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industry perspective, corporate governance involves the manner in which the business and
affairs of banks are governed by the board of directors and senior management that affects
how they set corporate objectives; operate the bank’s business on a day-to-day basis; meet
the obligation of accountability to their shareholders and take into account the interests of
other recognized stakeholders; align corporate activities and behaviour with the expectation
that banks will operate in a safe and sound manner, and in compliance with applicable laws
and regulations; and protect the interests of depositors.”172
Good governance is linked with effective oversight of a bank’s business activities; the Basel
Committee encourages banks to comply with eight high-level principles, offering detailed
standards in its guidelines. The principles are aimed at all types of bank capital and
governance structures, including publicly traded or privately held, but recognize a
proportional aspect to banks’ ability to comply. Directors should be qualified for their
positions, and be able to exercise sound judgment about the affairs of the bank, including
appropriate responsibility for the operations and financial soundness of the bank. These
qualifications include the skills to understand the bank’s risk profile, approve its overall
business strategy, risk policy and risk management procedures; select, monitor and, where
necessary, replace key executives; provide oversight of the senior management; have
oversight of strategic objectives and values; set and enforce clear lines of responsibility
throughout organization; ensure sound internal audit controls; understand the bank’s
operational structure and complexity of structured products; and meet regularly with senior
management and internal auditors. The guidelines call for an appropriate number of
independent non-executive qualified directors that have “an adequate collective knowledge
of each of the types of material activities of the bank”.173 The guidelines recommend that
large banks have an audit committee, with a majority comprised of independent directors
that have a clear understanding of their governance duties regarding risk management.
These governance guidelines were published in 2006. Many are responsive to agency issues
raised by bank governance structures. Unfortunately, principles do not equal change. The
principles aimed at effective bank governance existed before the crisis, but they were not
effectively adopted such that they may have prevented some bank failures. 174 One question
is whether there now exist the appropriate incentives to bring such governance standards
into practice, or whether there continues to be a problem with encouraging compliance with
these non-binding international norms.
ii.

Accountability to Stakeholders

There needs to be a deeper understanding of prudential oversight and the obligation of
directors to ensure the safety and soundness of the bank or other financial institution. One
approach is to substitute shareholder supremacy with stakeholder supremacy either by
substituting the shareholder-only-oriented goal of value maximization with that of depositor172
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restrained value maximization, or, slightly less far-reaching, by requiring directors and
officers to take the interests of depositors into account.175 Directors should act in best
interests of the financial institution as a whole and its beneficiaries, including depositors,
creditors and investors. Such interests include ensuring appropriate limits on leverage;
reasonable liquidity; protection of depositors; and addressing the agency issues. Bank
corporate governance should take account of both types of stakeholders and the stability of
the financial system, due to the systemic nature of bank activities.
Another public policy question issue in need of serious consideration is the social utility of
derivatives versus the harms; and the extent of a bank’s accountability to stakeholders where
activities are highly speculative. Arguably, there should be a partial restriction of their use by
financial institutions that have prudential obligations. The scope of any such limits is in
urgent need of a public policy discussion.
Governance responses should recognize differing interests in the financial system. Interests
that are affected are beyond private financial markets participants; they include employees,
creditors, equity holders, depositors, and the broader public interest. Moreover, where the
government has become a shareholder as a result of using public funds for a bail out, there
may be a need to design principles of accountability for governments acting simultaneously
as regulator, shareholder and creditor.
iii.

Director Obligations and Incentives

The regulatory overlay of monitoring needs to be complemented by effective oversight
within the banks’ corporate governance structure. There need to be appropriate incentives
for directors to pursue the bank’s best interests. Boards must devote more time to
governance and oversight. Directors must be willing and able to ensure that the risk
management framework and risk appetite of the financial institution are appropriate. A
number of policy questions should be explored. Should there be minimum length of board
meetings, or limits on number of directorships held? Should regulators condition the
availability of a due diligence defence on time spent on director duties? Should there be
financial literacy qualifications? Arguably, board and director performance appraisal should
be linked to risk management and assessment as well as profitability. There should be
mechanisms to increase the relationship of decision makers with stakeholders, which could
include election, review, and tying promotion to stakeholder support of overall governance.
The classic view of director and officer performance-based compensation is that it aligns the
interests of officers and shareholders, particularly where compensation is comprised of a
substantial component of equity-based compensation, such as options and allocation of
shares. However, compensation practices that allowed officers to cash in equity based
compensation on an ongoing or short-term basis created the opposite incentives.
Performance targets that are linked to short-term realization create incentives for banks to
move from longer term lower risk assets, such as mortgages, to higher risk structured
financial products. As noted above, the Basel guidelines, which were not effectively adopted,
called for boards to ensure that compensation policies and practices are consistent with the
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bank’s long-term objectives and strategy; and that remuneration of non-executive directors
and executive directors and senior managers should be set in such a way that incentives do
not overly depend on short-term performance and trading gains.
Director and officer remuneration should be linked with long term health of bank.
Compensation should be structured to reduce incentives to take excessive risk. It should
reward effective oversight of regulatory compliance, independent monitoring of audit and
operational functions, and responses to market changes.176 Officers should be incentivized to
better understand risk in particular circumstances; identify risks of structured financial
products; understand inappropriate risk concentration; shift risk stress tests from focus on
past events to identifying new risks and potential outcomes and adjustments; and ensure a
continuous understanding firm’s risk position compared with risk appetite.
Remuneration systems should also focus on staff whose activities can have a material impact
on the risk exposure of the financial institution. For employees with responsibility for risk
and compliance functions, remuneration should be linked to achieving safety and soundness.
Regulators could create guidance or standards that specify criteria for the link. Another
governance strategy is to accord more authority to the risk management function within
financial institutions to counterbalance risk-takers, including direct access to the board of
directors, to allow timely review, evaluation and action to refine strategies and a predictive
mechanism for discerning and addressing evolving risks.
Globally, the majority of bank boards are comprised of inside directors or cross-sector
appointment of directors that are not independent.177 Yet, prescience requires financial skills,
and a capacity for independent second look at decisions. Does a director’s willingness to test
or challenge strategies need independence from the banking sector or is there another
approach that will ensure challenges occur? Any governance improvement must ensure the
appropriate balance of diversity, independence and skills of directors. Regulators face time
lags and information asymmetries, and thus governance norms should complement and
enhance legal standards.
In summary, the issue of director obligations requires considerably more scrutiny and public
policy debate. Arguably, there should be a requirement for directors to take account of the
sustainability of the bank, adopting less risky strategies and increasing the quality of bank
long-term risk management strategy. Any corporate governance reform must not lose sight
of the prudential nature of banks and thus of director obligations. There is a need to change
incentives to ensure management and directors are more prudent.
iv.

Early Intervention in Governance Where There are Solvency Concerns

Another option is to have a system of early intervention where governance issues are
identified, including the authority to remove the directors and senior management of a
failing financial institution and hold them to account. The EU proposals discussed above
have the potential to effect this governance shift. A working example of an effective system
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is the Canadian system of early intervention, described in some detail here. It works with the
directors and officers of banks at early stages of problems, affording them considerable
opportunity to remedy problems before the government intervenes to remedy the financial
instability.
In Canada, the Office of the Supervisor of Financial Institutions (OSFI)178 has an
intervention process that enables it and the Canadian Deposit Insurance Corporation
(CDIC), Canada’s national deposit insurance fund, to identify areas of liquidity and solvency
concern at an early stage and intervene effectively so as to minimize losses to depositors.179
OSFI supervises and regulates all banks in Canada and all federally incorporated or
registered trust and loan companies, insurance companies, cooperative credit associations,
fraternal benefit societies and private pension plans, a total of 1,836 firms.180
Canada’s statutes governing banks and other financial institutions provide a wide range of
discretionary intervention powers that allow the supervisor to intervene to address
governance concerns that may arise with federally-regulated deposit-taking institutions
(banks).181 OSFI conducts risk-based assessments of the safety and soundness of banks and
other financial institutions.182 All assessments made throughout the intervention process
consider the unique circumstances of the financial institution, including the nature, scope,
complexity and risk profile. There are 5 levels of assessment.
The first level is No significant problems/Normal activities, whereby OSFI determines that the
institution’s financial conditions are sufficient and that circumstances do not indicate
significant problems or control deficiencies. The bank’s performance has been satisfactory to
good, with most key indicators comparable or in excess of industry norms.183 OSFI assesses
the financial condition and operating performance, reviewing information obtained from
financial reporting requirements and management reporting to the board; and offers a
composite risk rating.184
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Then Stage 1 is an Early Warning Stage, where OSFI has identified deficiencies in the
institution’s financial condition, policies or procedures that could lead to problems if they are
not promptly addressed. Example conditions include the combination of the institution’s
overall net risk and its capital and earnings compromises the institution’s resilience; or the
institution has issues in its risk management that, although not serious enough to present a
threat to solvency, could deteriorate into more serious problems if not addressed.185 OSFI
notifies management, the board and the external auditor by way of a supervisory letter,
requiring bank officers to take measures to mitigate or rectify the identified deficiencies.
OSFI may meet with management, the board of directors and/or the external auditor to
outline concerns and discuss remedial actions; may send a notice of assessment surcharge to
the institution; monitor the institution on an escalating basis by increasing the frequency of
reporting requirements and/or expanding the level of detail of information that the bank is
required to submit; conduct enhanced or more frequent supervisory reviews, or direct the
institution’s internal specialists to conduct reviews that focus on particular areas of concern
such as asset or loan security valuations. OFSI may also determine the need for a prudential
agreement with the institution for the purpose of implementing measures designed to
maintain or improve the safety and soundness of the institution.186 At this stage, OSFI also
has authority to require the financial institution to increase its capital or impose business
restrictions or compliance directions on the bank in appropriate circumstances.
The CDIC would not normally intervene at Stage 1, but it might place the bank on its
“watchlist”; or levy a premium surcharge if it fails to comply with the policy of deposit
insurance that requires the bank to have in place appropriate, effective and prudent practices
with respect to corporate governance, risk management, liquidity and capital management,
and controls.187 CDIC can also request that the bank or entity that controls it provide an
undertaking to rectify areas of concern.
At Stage 2, called Risk to Financial Viability or Solvency, the bank poses material safety and
soundness concerns. At this stage, OSFI has identified problems that could deteriorate into a
serious situation if not addressed promptly, although there is not an immediate threat to
solvency. Examples here include: the combination of the institution’s overall net risk, capital
and earnings makes it vulnerable to adverse business and economic conditions that may pose
a serious threat to its financial viability unless effective corrective action is implemented; and
the bank has risk management issues that could deteriorate into more serious problems if
not addressed promptly. OSFI measures at this stage include requiring the institution to
Monitoring any corrective measures may include requesting additional information and/or conducting
follow-up supervisory reviews.
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incorporate in the business plan appropriate remedial measures aimed at rectifying problems
within a specified time frame; imposing more frequent reporting requirements; conducting
follow-up supervisory reviews more frequently and/or enlarging their scope; requiring the
external auditor to enlarge the scope of the review of the financial statements; requiring the
institution to conduct a special audit to be performed by an outside auditor; and/or
developing a contingency plan to enable OSFI to be ready to take rapid control of the
institution or its assets in case of further deterioration.188
The CDIC at Stage 2 may send the chief executive officer or board chairperson a formal
report if the bank is not in compliance with a CDIC by-law or is in breach of its policy of
deposit insurance, including the condition requiring that member institutions have
appropriate, effective and prudent practices with respect to corporate governance, risk
management, liquidity, capital management and controls.189 If CDIC is not satisfied with
progress made in rectifying the situation, CDIC must inform the bank and the Minister of
Finance. CDIC may, subject to the Minister's advice that it is not in the public interest to do
so, terminate the member institution's policy of deposit insurance, on notice;190 conduct a
preparatory examination if CDIC believes that the making of a payment in respect of
deposits held by the bank is imminent and that it would be in the best interest of depositors
and CDIC that preparations be made to make that payment as soon as possible;191 or apply
to court for an order directing the bank to comply with the CDICA.192
Stage 3 is where OSFI determines that the future financial viability of the bank in serious
doubt because the bank has failed to remedy the problems that were identified at Stage 2 and
the situation is worsening. The financial institution has severe safety and soundness concerns
and is experiencing problems that pose a material threat to its solvency. The combination of
the institution’s overall net risk, capital and earnings makes it vulnerable to adverse business
and economic conditions or there are control deficiencies that pose a serious threat to its
solvency unless effective corrective action is promptly implemented. OSFI may direct
external specialists or professionals to assess certain areas such as quality of loan security,
asset values, sufficiency of reserves, etc.; enhance the scope of business restrictions that have
already been imposed on the bank and/or expand the level of detail of information that the
bank is required to submit to OSFI; place OSFI staff at the institution to monitor the
situation on an ongoing basis; expand contingency planning; and communicate to
management and the board of directors the importance of considering resolution options
such as restructuring the institution or seeking a prospective purchaser.
The CDIC at this Stage can minimize its exposure by providing support for a restructuring
transaction by taking such measures as acquiring assets from the bank; making or
guaranteeing loans or advances, with or without security, to the bank; and making or
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guaranteeing a deposit with the bank.193
Finally, at Stage 4, the OSFI has determined that non-viability or insolvency is imminent and
the bank is experiencing severe financial difficulties and has deteriorated to such an extent
that the institution has failed to meet regulatory capital requirements in conjunction with an
inability to rectify the situation on an immediate basis. The statutory conditions for taking
control have been met; and/or the institution has failed to develop and implement an
acceptable business plan such that insolvency is inevitable within a short period of time.
OSFI can assume temporary control of the institution or its assets, unless the Minister
advises OSFI that it is not in the public interest to do so. OSFI can request that the Attorney
General of Canada apply for a winding-up order in respect of the institution where its assets
or the institution is under the control of the Superintendent.
CDIC’s activities at this stage may involve cancelling the policy of deposit insurance of the
bank if CDIC is of the opinion that the bank is or is about to become insolvent;194 initiating
the financial institution restructuring provisions (FIRP), following receipt of the formal
OSFI report that the bank has ceased, or is about to cease, to be viable or circumstances
exist that would allow the Superintendent to take control and grounds would exist to make a
winding-up order.195 The CDIC asks the Minister of Finance to recommend that the
Governor in Council issue a FIRP order if a restructuring transaction is likely to be
expeditiously entered into and is consistent with CDIC’s objects. It may also apply for a
winding-up order under the Winding-up and Restructuring Act where CDIC concludes the bank
is or is about to become insolvent, unless the Minister advises that it would not be in the
public interest to do so. The CDIC may act as a liquidator or receiver if appointed as such.
CDIC gives public notice of the termination or cancellation of the member institution’s
policy of deposit insurance if the public interest requires that such notice be given.196
As at March 31, 2010, there had been 50 staged institutions, the majority of the staged
institutions were in the Stage 1 Early Warning stage.197 The year prior there were 56
interventions. For the year ending March 31, 2008, there were 25 staged institutions, of
which 22 were at stage 1 and three were at stage 2.198 OSFI’s early intervention allows
governance issues to be addressed long before insolvency, resulting in almost no bank
failures in Canada. While there are arguably other reasons for the soundness of the Canadian
system, such as the structure of the sector, it is likely that the early intervention has been
helpful in remedying governance issues on a timely basis. OSFI issues a Composite Risk
Rating (CRR ) that represents its overall assessment of an institution’s safety and soundness,
with four ratings of low, moderate, above average and high risk. As at the end of March
193

Ibid. at 9.
Ibid., subject to the Minister’s advice that it is not in the public interest to do so, and after notifying the
Superintendent.
195
Under a FIRP, an order may be made by the Governor in Council, on the recommendation of the
Minister, to vest the shares and subordinated debt of a federal member institution in CDIC and/or appoint
CDIC as receiver of the member for purposes of carrying out a transaction or a series of transactions to
restructure a substantial part of the bank’s business.
196
Ibid. at 10.
197
OSFI Annual Report 2009-2010, supra, note 180.
198
OSFI Annual Report 2007-2008, http://www.osfibsif.gc.ca/app/DocRepository/1/eng/reports/osfi/ar0708_e.pdf.
194

42
2010, OSFI assigned a low or moderate CRR to 88% of all rated institutions and rated 12%,
48 financial institutions, as either above average or high risk. Those numbers were 89% and
11% respectively as at March 31, 2009.199
The five stages under Canadian banking law ensure that governance is corrected, business
plans adjusted and liquidity risks are addressed long before insolvency. Given the importance
of banks to the financial system, this prudential approach makes sense. Where the financial
supervisor has had several levels of intervention prior to a financial institution filing under
insolvency legislation, arguably, at the point of an insolvency filing, the directors and officers
have had a full opportunity to remedy the governance problems of the firm. Hence, it does
not make sense to afford them yet another opportunity to remain in control. This situation is
in contrast to normal corporate insolvency proceedings in many countries, whereby
commencement of insolvency proceedings often represents the first stage of remedying the
governance, financial and operational problems of the insolvent company.200
The EU bank resolution framework, discussed above, includes a number of governance
initiatives, including a requirement to prepare resolution plans to ensure adequate planning
for financial stress or failure. Supervisors may also be given the authority to appoint a special
manager for a limited period of up to one year to take over the management, or assist the
existing management, of a bank that is failing to meet the requirements of the CRD and has
not developed or implemented a credible recovery plan. The special manager would exercise
all the powers of the management, but its primary duty would be to restore the soundness of
the institution.201
vi.

Deposit Insurance or Guarantee Schemes

Another issue that relates to governance are deposit insurance funds. Deposit insurance
guarantee funds have been aimed at protecting small investors, providing a guarantee, to a
capped amount, on bank savings or the value of insurance policies. They also serve as a
confidence enhancing aspect of financial services, reducing the risk of runs on a bank. The
amount of coverage under such funds has traditionally been limited, in order that banks not
have an incentive to shirk their prudential obligations.
One problem during the crisis was that deposit guarantee funds in many jurisdictions were
not prefunded. The assumption was that if a bank failed, other banks in the jurisdiction
would be available to meet the deposit guarantee promise. The structure did not account for
multiple bank failures in the same jurisdiction. The lacking of funding then meant that
governments had little choice but to offer bailout funding, as depositors’ savings would be
lost otherwise. However, such a strategy carried with it moral hazard; banks understood that
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they were not required to prefund, and the lack of protection for such depositors meant that
the banks could count on the risk of depositor losses to leverage government bailouts at a
time of financial distress.
A number of jurisdictions have now moved to increase the amount of coverage for deposit
insurance or guarantee schemes. For example, the EU amended its Directive depositguarantee schemes to require member states to raise the existing minimum coverage level of
20,000 € to 100,000 € by 31 December 2010.202 The US Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation raised the minimum coverage level of 100,000 USD until December 2013 to
250,000 USD; and it set up a temporary liquidity program, allowing US banks to issue certain
senior unsecured debt guaranteed by the FDIC.203
Deposit guarantee schemes do not have the same purpose as bank resolution guarantee
funds; however, some countries use their schemes to provide certain forms of resolution
financing, including some EU member states. In Canada, the CDIC can control its exposure
by providing support for a restructuring transaction; making or guaranteeing loans or
advances, with or without security, to the bank; and making or guaranteeing a deposit with
the bank.204 The EC has proposed that deposit guarantee schemes could be used for bank
resolution measures involving the transfer of deposits to another entity, provided that the
amount of funds used does not exceed the amount that would have been necessary to repay
depositors; any additional costs should fall to the resolution funds.205
Deposit guarantee funds can weaken the incentives for stakeholders to monitor governance
and temper higher risk business practices because the insurance offers baseline protection
for depositors.206 However, the amounts protected by deposit insurance schemes are
relatively modest, targeted at the most vulnerable small depositors. Even with the recent
increases in the amount of deposit insurance required, significant market players or small to
medium businesses are not protected for most of their investments; hence they may not
have an incentive to shirk monitoring through deposit insurance, and may hold officers
more accountable. Given that deposit insurance guarantee funds do not protect banks’
deposits in other banks, arguably, interbank incentives to monitor are not reduced by the
existence of deposit insurance.
vii. Appropriate Oversight of Securitization
Banks should retain a sufficiently strong economic interest in the securitized assets they sell.
In general, this requirement would mean retaining some exposure to securitization cash
flows where payoffs are especially sensitive to how well the bank performs its origination,
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monitoring and servicing activities.207 Such requirements could address some of the
immediate agency issues associated with the speculative market.208 The US Dodd-Frank Act
requires that companies that sell products like mortgage-backed securities retain at least 5%
of the credit risk, unless the underlying loans meet standards that reduce riskiness. It requires
issuers to disclose more information about the underlying assets and to analyze the quality of
the underlying assets. This minimal requirement should be applied to all securitization.
Arguably, requiring 5% “skin in the game” may be limited in its effectiveness in creating
appropriate incentives to monitor the products, as the threshold of retaining economic
interest is so low, it may simply be viewed as the price of participating in the market, and not
create the hoped for incentives to monitor the quality of credit decisions. There needs to be
a public policy discussion as to whether this amount is large enough to change conduct or
prevent harms.
A further requirement for well functioning financial markets is that investors in
securitization instruments should have a good understanding of the associated risks, and
thus the opaque nature of financial products needs to be made considerably more
transparent.
IV.

Concluding Thoughts

The global discussion on preventive measures in respect of financial institutions continues.
One approach to discerning policy options is to consider what is prudential, prescient and
pragmatic for financial institutions going forward.
i.

Prudential

In terms of prudential obligations, directors and officers of financial institutions should act
in the best interests of the organization in the long term, taking account of the interests of
beneficiaries: depositors, life insurance policyholders, deposit insurance funds, creditors and
investors. Taking account of diverse interests may serve as a mechanism to adopt less risky
strategies and increase the quality of bank long-term risk management strategies. Prudential
conduct may mean limits on leveraging and reasonable liquidity; and addressing agency
problems in order to maintain confidence in financial system. Prudential obligations should
include protection of depositors and insurance policyholders. One policy question is should
directors and officers have a direct fiduciary obligation or duty of care to deposit holders?
Bank corporate governance should take account of both stakeholders and the stability of the
financial system, due to the systemic nature of bank activities. Governance could be more
responsive to the conflicting interests of managers either by direct representation of broad
interests on the board of directors or by regulator imperative. One question for public policy
discussion, given the prudential nature of banks, is whether there should be at least some
director elections by non-shareholding stakeholders?
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It makes sense to implement remuneration schemes that counteract incentives at all levels
for short-term returns to potential detriment of sustainability. Financial reward should be
separated from excessive risk taking. Directors and officers should be able to demonstrate
to the regulator that they have sufficient knowledge and control over the bank’s risk profile.
There should also be authority to remove the directors and senior management of a failing
financial institution and hold to them to account for failure to meet their prudential
obligations. A financially distressed financial institution should ensure that there is sufficient
expertise and resources to govern resolution of the distress.
The debate about effective bank corporate governance raises the question of why corporate
law should intervene over and above standards for acceptable level of risk taking established
by prudential regulation. Arguably, there is need to change incentives for management and
directors to be more prudent, which in turn might overcome shortcomings in regulatory
resources and ability. At the same time, it is important that new regulatory measures do not
seriously impair financial activity necessary for liquidity function, creating a further credit
crisis.
ii.

Prescient

There should be mechanisms to increase the relationship of decision makers with
stakeholders, such as election, review of activities or tying promotion to stakeholder
satisfaction. Public disclosures under financial services law could enhance the quality and
accessibility of disclosure to stakeholders and regulators. Strategic planning should link risk
management to achievement the financial institution’s overall objectives. Regulators could
create guidance or standards that specify criteria for that link. There should be enhanced
oversight of regulatory compliance, and independent monitoring of audit and operational
functions and corporate responses to market changes. There should be public policy
discussion of the extent to which gatekeepers should also be made responsible for their part
of regulatory compliance.
Financial institutions and regulators need to develop a better understanding of risk in
particular circumstances; including identifying the downside risks of new structured financial
products as they come on the market; and understanding inappropriate risk concentration.
Risk stress tests should shift from their focus on past events to identifying new risks and
potential outcomes and adjustments. Directors and officers should have continuous
understanding the firm’s risk position compared with its risk appetite. Employees
responsible for risk monitoring and assessment should have more authority to
counterbalance risk-takers, including direct access to the board where there are concerns
about the level of risk. Risk management employees should be considered senior
management, meeting regularly with the board to allow timely review, evaluation and action
to refine strategies. Financial institutions should develop predictive mechanisms for
discerning and address evolving risks and real time communication to board; rather than take
false comfort in regulatory capital ratios. Prescience requires financial skills, but also a
capacity for an independent second look at decisions.
There is also a need to link financial sustainability with other aspects of social, environmental
sustainability measures, including requiring reporting and use of widely accepted standards.
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It is important to reduce conflicts of interest within the complex structure of global financial
institutions and their interactions; such as professionals advising on investments while
managing investment funds. Remuneration should be more directly linked with the long
term health of the bank, reducing incentives to take excessive risk. Remuneration systems
should arguably also focus on target staff whose activities can have a material impact on the
risk exposure of the financial institution. For employees in risk and compliance functions,
remuneration could be tied to achieving sustainability.
iii.

Pragmatic

Pragmatically, there should be governance and regulatory structures that operate on a timely
and effective basis. Governance standards should ensure the appropriate balance of
independence and skills of directors. One way to accomplish this goal would be to enhance
board diversity; do banks need some regulatory rule or guidance on this issue?
The Basel principles for governance regarding the specialized skills and qualities of directors
are aimed at ensuring that they engage in oversight of strategic objectives and values; set and
enforce clear lines of responsibility throughout organization; ensure sound internal audit
controls; and understand bank’s operational structure and complexity of structure or
products, all important principles. Pragmatically, how do we transfer non-binding
international principles into accepted practice? One mechanism is to ensure appropriate
incentives for directors and officers to pursue the bank’s best interests, though
compensation, fear of liability or a combination of the two. Boards must devote more time
to governance and oversight. Directors must be willing and able to ensure the risk
management framework and risk appetite of the financial institution are appropriate. Board
and director performance should be linked to risk management and sustainability of the
financial institution as well as profitability.
Financial institutions and persons that create or recommend derivatives products should
meet due diligence standards in examining and disclosing material adverse risk in derivative
products being sold in the public market. New products could be certified as transparent
before being sold. There should be remedies for purchasers from failure of those individuals
recommending products to meet due diligence and disclosure obligations. Financial
institutions that recommend derivatives products must train employees responsible for
distributing risk products to understand and communicate the risk and understand conflicts
of interest.
Another pragmatic change would be mandatory disclosure during a restructuring proceeding
of the real economic risks at stake, including disclosure of the amount of debt that has been
hedged by creditors that seek to exercise their voting or oversight rights in a restructuring
proceeding. Lack of transparency now means that the debtor bank and other creditors are
not aware of who is bearing the real economic risk of bank failure, inhibiting the potential
for a viable business restructuring plan.209 The court’s consideration of any restructuring plan
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should take account of economic interests at risk, either by requiring that voting on a
restructuring plan is premised on the real economic interests in the bank’s insolvency or
granting courts authority to weigh actual economic interests when considering parties’
exercise of voting rights.210
As noted above, regulatory and governance responses to the financial crisis should recognize
differing interests in the financial system; interests affected are beyond private financial
markets participants and include employees, creditors, equity holders, depositors, and the
broader public interest.
These suggestions all require further public policy debate. The initiatives globally reflect a
growing consensus that the harms caused by the financial crisis need a timely and
coordinated response. In the context of that response, bank supervisors and other regulators
are working to find the appropriate mix of prudential oversight and private sector
governance. The comprehensive reforms, if implemented on a timely basis, are likely to
address a number of the issues raised by the financial crisis. Equally, however, they raise a
number of important policy questions about whether the reforms have addressed the full
range of contributing factors and whether they go far enough in altering the pre-crisis
incentives in the banking sector.
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